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Whither HMA Policy? Linking HMA and Development Assistance by Rasmussen [ from page 4 ]
1. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Executive Summary,” Landmine Monitor: Toward 
a Mine-Free World, (1999): 5.
2. The U.S. State Department credits The HALO Trust with coining the term “humanitarian 
demining” in 1988 as it differentiated military demining in Afghanistan from efforts designed 
specifically to reduce the ongoing threat to civilians, livelihoods, communities, and public 
infrastructure in terms of post-war reconstruction. The U.S. later established an inter-agency 
Humanitarian Demining Program in 1993 (consolidating under one policy roof such programs 
as Afghanistan 1988, Cambodia 1991, Kuwait 1991, Northern Iraq 1992, Somalia 1991, El 
Salvador 1993, and Mozambique 1993); in 1997, the United States designated a Special Rep-
resentative of the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining; and in 
1998 the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs was established in the State Department 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs as the lead for HMA, see https://bit.ly/39gYIZg.
3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, p. 12. 
4. “Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),” MDGS.un.org, accessed 25 March 2020, https://
bit.ly/2y2URSs.
5. John McArthur, Krista Rasmussen, “How successful were the Millennium Development 
Goals?” 11 January 2017, https://brook.gs/2zoXbEw.
6. As Stanley Brown, Acting U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Af-
fairs, noted recently: “From a global perspective, the United States has provided over [$3.7] 
billion in CWD assistance to more than 100 countries since 1993. Over those 26 years, how 
we prioritized those funds has changed based on foreign policy priorities, the context of 
international security and post-conflict recovery, and our application of programmatic tools 
to achieve those objectives,” (See “Evolving Funding Models and Donors Remarks.” Remarks 
at Wilton Park Conference, Magaliesburg, South Africa, November 6, 2019. https://www.
state.gov/evolving-funding-models-and-donors/). (NB: The figure of $3.7B reflects an upward 
adjustment based on more current data as reported on page 5 of To Walk the Earth In Safety 
2019: the prior quote used $3.4 billion).  
The tension and need to balance between the moral and political imperatives has long been 
present, going back, for example, to the first U.S. government interagency strategic plan for 
humanitarian demining, which was prepared at the Directive of President Clinton back in 
January 1996 in continuation of President Bush’s September 1993 National Security Council 
directive to establish such a body (see https://bit.ly/3auDh88). The plan states that “the 
purpose of the U.S. Government (USG) humanitarian demining program is to assist selected 
countries to relieve human suffering and develop an indigenous demining capability while 
promoting U.S. interests.  To achieve program goals, the USG must balance its political, 
military, technological and economic capabilities with available resources.” The point is, how 
governments fund spending is a political decision around political priorities, and currently the 
politics suggest greater fiduciary oversight for development assistance and HMA, especially 
in the face of seemingly competing priorities within and across foreign and domestic policy 
fronts. Return on investment matters: Evidence matters.
7. According to the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. budget for 2019 was just under $200 
million, per planned allocations. It should also be noted that the total amount of U.S. assis-
tance also includes additional munitions related spending of roughly $10.2 million in Defense 
Department spending as well as $12.2 million from USAID in 2018, and planned amounts 
for 2019 of approximately $20 million and $12.5 million, respectively.  See To Walk the Earth 
in Safety, 19th Edition, 02 April 2020 https://www.state.gov/reports/to-walk-the-earth-in-
safety-2020/.
8. To Walk the Earth in Safety, 19th Edition, 02 April 2020.
9. It should be noted that these figures, while reported by the Monitor, may be off a little as 
some funding was likely spent on minor small arms/light weapons activities and not all went 
to HMA.
10. A review of the annual Landmine Monitor reports for the years 2015 – 2019 indicate that the 
following six countries received roughly 52% of the total global mine action assistance: Iraq 
($469.7M), Afghanistan ($273M), Syria ($191.5M), Lao PDR ($186.4), Cambodia ($121.8M), 
and Colombia ($118.5M).
11. “Development aid drops in 2018, especially to neediest countries,” OECD.org, 10 April 2019, 
accessed 25 March 2020, https://bit.ly/2xZRxYf (accessed 20 October 2019).
12. “Development aid rises again in 2016,” OECD.org, 11 April 2017, accessed 25 March 2020, 
https://bit.ly/2WGHJN7.
13. Landmine Monitor 2019, p. 84, November 2019, https://bit.ly/304Bmoy, accessed 2 June 
2020.
14. Other issues have certainly had a positive impact in terms of generating support, such as the 
ethical argument that mines are indiscriminate weapons, disproportionately affect the poor, 
have long shelf-lives, and the causal devastation carries generational impact for families and 
communities. However, casualty and victim reduction results have tended to lead the way.
15. Landmine Monitor 2019, p. 32.
16. Landmine Monitor 2019, p. 54.
17. The 2019 Report states that in 2018 “at least 3,059 people were killed, and another 3,837 
people were injured.” This notwithstanding, earlier mine related casualty data from the 2017 
Landline Monitor is used in order enable a comparison across a similar time frame with data 
reflecting typical causes and rates of death in the developing world inasmuch as global health 
reporting typically has a much longer lag time.
18. The UN’s Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation reported the median of under five 
child mortality for Sub-Saharan Africa was 82.2 per 1000 live births and 46.4 for South Asia. 
In contrast, the North American rate was 6.6, while Western Europe was 4.9. See https://
childmortality.org/.
19. Lucia Hug, David Sharrow, and Danzhen You, “Levels & Trends in Child Mortality Report 
2017,” UNICEF, 2017, https://uni.cf/3cMWEKh.
20. Lucia Hug, David Sharrow, and Danzhen You, 2017. 
21. WHO, “World malaria report 2017,” November 2017, https://bit.ly/3fg7E4t.
22. WHO, “Diarrhoeal disease,” 2 May 2017, https://bit.ly/2AlgXkA.
23. Michela Sonego, Maria Chiara Pellegrin, Genevieve Becker, and Marzia Lazzerini, “Risk Factors 
for Mortality from Acute Lower Respiratory Infections (ALRI) in Children under Five Years of 
Age in Low and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Obser-
vational Studies,” PLOS One 10, no. 1, (2015),  https://bit.ly/2BXr3sF.
24. WHO suggests $1,000 per capita on health care is the needed global average to dramati-
cally improve health-based quality of life. This is, however, well beyond the means of many 
underdeveloped countries, as half the world’s countries spend less than $350 per capita per 
annum.
25. Without even modeling potential effects, the HMA community can do a better job of break-
ing down and communicating the impact clearing the aforementioned 149 sq kilometers had 
on human and community security and well-being, and do so with attention to sustainability, 
i.e., longitudinal results. For example, a development oriented HMA key performance indica-
tor might include sustainability, measured by an impact assessment at 1 and 3 year intervals 
of critical but situationally tailored sub-indicators.
26. Fortunately, there is a body of work on which to draw. Two 2004 PRIO publications provide a 
sufficient base, Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine action in support of peacebuilding, and 
the joint publication with UNDP, Reclaiming the Fields of War: Mainstreaming mine action 
in development. Other representative efforts include the 2008 GICHD report, Linking Mine 
Action and Development, the 2014 DfID publication Clearing a Path to Development, and the 
2016 UNDP report, Mine Action for Sustainable Development. The DFiD publication includes 
a well thought out theory of change, however, Itad—the firm hired in 2019 to evaluate DfID’s 
Global Mine Action Programme (2018–2021)—stated they struggled to find good empirical 
research on the causal connections. Itad noted this is partially due to the lack of policy and 
operational orientations guiding inquiry into the linkage, especially in terms of longitudinal 
impact. (See https://www.itad.com/article/linking-mine-action-to-development-the-need-
for-generating-evidence-of-longer-term-change/.)  Clearly more work needs to be done by 
both the development assistance community and the mine action community, each working 
toward new, but common middle ground.  
Toward that end, two other documents explore both policy and operational considerations 
in terms of linking mine action and development—the 2017 joint publication by GICHD and 
UNDP, Leaving No One Behind: Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, and 
the latest United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023. The former maps and explains 
major direct and indirect linkages between the six primary HMA tasks (land release, victim 
assistance, gender mainstreaming, risk education, physical security and stockpile manage-
ment, capacity building, and partnerships) and the 17 SDGs. The UN strategy guideline states 
clearly that, “Mine action has become a nexus between humanitarian action, peace and 
security, and development as well as a cornerstone for conflict prevention.” The strategy also 
articulates “the strategic objectives and commitments of the United Nations to address the 
evolving context and nature of explosive ordnance, and the humanitarian and development 
challenges these pose.” Furthermore, it states that “United Nations activities at both global 
and national levels to ensure responsiveness to context-specific needs and priorities, while 
ensuring the integration of mine action across broader humanitarian, human rights, peace 
and security, and development responses.”   
27. “IMAS 14.20 Evaluation of the mine risk education programmes and projects,” 23 December 
2003, accessed 24 March 2020, https://bit.ly/3aiKkRh.
28. “Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” 
APLC/CONF/2019/5, 9 December 2019, https://bit.ly/2YnKuSF.
29. For a good treatment of standardizing and better utilizing this type of KPIs, see Roly Evans 
and David Hewitson, “Key Performance Indicators and HMA: Time to Standardize?” The 
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 23, no. 2 (2019): 46–55.
30. To Walk the Earth in Safety, 2020.
31. It should be noted that this last concern is often made more challenging for both the HMA 
and development assistance communities given the demands of working with host country 
counterpart institutions who at times lack either or both necessary institutional capacity and 
political will.
32. To Walk the Earth in Safety, 2020, p. 37
33. “Leaving no one Behind: Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals,” GICHD and 
UNDP, June 2017, accessed 25 March 2020, https://bit.ly/2xjIpxn.
34. In September 2016, Lao PDR did just this, developing their own SDG18: Lives Safe from UXO.  
In so doing they crosswalk their SDG18 with SDG1: No Poverty, SDG 5: Gender Equality, SDG 
8: Decent Work and Economic Growth, SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities, SDG 16: Peace, Justice 
and Strong Institutions. See https://bit.ly/3alYqlc.
35. Russell Gasser, “Linking Mine Action and Development: Local-level Benefits and Challenges,” 
The Journal of ERW and Mine Action 12, no. 2, (2008): 6, accessed 18 December 2016, http://
www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/12.2/editorials/gasser/gasser.shtml.
36. An excellent illustration of this principle is found in the collaboration between the Angolan 
government, the National Geographic Society, The HALO Trust and the UK government and 
the British public in terms of decontaminating the Okavango River Basin in Angola. Such col-
laboration has not only begun to produce results in respect to promoting economically viable 
use of land, but also river-based transportation, eco-tourism, environmental and scientific 
research and discovery, as well as being better able to address a range of human and natural 
threats facing the natural and built environment, wildlife and the Okavango Watershed itself. 
HALO, long active in Angola, has stepped up its involvement with clearance activity over the 
past few years in partnership with the National Geographic and its Okavango Wilderness 
Project. And, the Angolan government has also increased its financial and governance sup-
port of this work. The UK government, who has also long supported demining in Angola, has 
not only increased its recent assistance there, but announced in October 2019 an extension 
of the model used in Angola to its support of HMA in Zimbabwe. One pillar of such efforts 
includes the UK government doubling the private contributions made by the British people to 
the clearance effort, known as “Breaking Boundaries.”
Confidence-building Through Mine Action on the Korean Peninsula by Rhodes [ from page 9 ]
1. Bill Clinton, “Together with South Korea, we must advance peace talks with North Korea and 
bridge the cold war’s last divide,” State of the Union Address, 1997.
2. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote in a letter to the Foreign Minister of the 
DPRK dated 24 June 1994 that “the Security Council did not establish the unified command as 
a subsidiary organ under its control, but merely recommended the creation of such a com-
mand, specifying that it be under the authority of the United States.”
3. “Korean War,” Wikipedia, last modified 9 June 2020. https://bit.ly/2MMFTUE.
4. Armistice Agreement, Volume 1. https://bit.ly/2MLi6EW, paragraph 6.
5. Armistice Agreement, Volume 1. https://bit.ly/2MLi6EW, paragraph 10.
6. “Tall order to transform DMZ minefield into peace zone,” The Korea Herald, 26 October 2019.
7. Col. J.Lloyd and Major M.Born, “Demining and Remains Recovery in the DMZ,”, (unpublished 
manuscript, February 2020).
8. UNCSB JSA source.
9. “Battle of White Horse,” Wikipedia, last modified 7 April 2020.
10. “Sending States” refers to the sixteen troop-contributing states (in addition to the US) operat-
ing under the UN Flag in the Korean War.
11. Sanctuary of Endangered Wildlife, National Institute of Ecology (2018). 
12. Even with additional capacity the nature and extent of contamination in the DMZ will require 
many decades of work. The reference to fifteen years was perhaps restricted to clearance 
activities in the west of the DMZ only.
13. “Full text of President Moon Jae-in address to the 74th United Nations General Assembly,” 
Yonhap News Agency, 25 September 2019, https://bit.ly/3dUqvlq.
14. “IMAS Compliance Made Simple.” Accessed 19 June 2020. http://mineaction.net/.
15. For more details for the databasing of IMAS and compliance tool, see http://mineaction.net/.
16. “Landmine and Cluster Munition Blog, Archived.” Accessed 19 May 2020, https://bit.
ly/2WL8T59.  
Disposal of Explosive Ordnance and Environmental Risk Mitigation. Time for Humanitarian Mine
Action to Catch Up? by Evans and Duncan [ from page 18 ]
1. M.R. Walsh. Explosives Residues Resulting from the Detonation of Common Military Muni-
tions: 2002–2006 US Army Corps of Engineers. Engineer Research and Development Center. 
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory. February 2007. pg. 1–2.
2. M.R. Walsh, M.E. Walsh, I. Poulin, S. Taylor, & T.A. Douglas. “Energetic Residues from Detona-
tion of Common US Ordnance,” International Journal of Energetic Materials and Chemical 
Propulsion. Volume 10. 2011. pg. 169–186.
3. M. Walsh, S. Thiboutot, and B. Gullett. “Characterization of Residues from the Detonation of 
Insensitive Munitions,” SERDP Project ER-2219. November 2017. pg. 3–17.
4. T. Jenkins, C.Vogel. Department of Defense Best Management Practices for Munitions Con-
stituents on Operational Ranges. SERDP 2014. November 2014. pg. 2.
5. C. Ferreira, F. Freire and J. Ribeiro. “Environmental Management of Military Ranges with the 
Support of a Life-Cycle Assessment Approach,” Global Approach to Environmental Manage-
ment on Military Training Ranges. University of Cranfield. 2020. pg. 5-1–5-20, T. Temple and 
M. Ladyman (Eds)
6. Directorate of Environmental Remediation Programs. Environment and Engineering Branch. 
Department of Defence. Australian Government. Contamination Management Manual. An-
nex G. Firing Ranges. March 2018.
7. S. Thiboutot, R. Martel, S. Brochu and M. R. Walsh. “Mitigation of the Environmental Foot-
print of a Munition,” Global Approach to Environmental Management on Military Training 
Ranges. University of Cranfield. 2020. pg. 11-1–11-17, T. Temple and M. Ladyman (Eds)
8. H. Craig. “Review of Remediation Technologies for Energetics Contamination in the US,” 
Global Approach to Environmental Management on Military Training Ranges. University of 
Cranfield. 2020. pg. 7-1–7-34. T. Temple and M. Ladyman (Eds).
9. United States of America. Department of Defense. Munitions Demilitarization/Disposal 
Subgroup and Environmental Subgroup. Joint Ordnance Commanders Group (JOCG). Open 
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14.  nternational Ammunition Technical Guideline 10.10. Demilitarization and destruction of 
conventional ammunition. UN ODA-2015.
15. The most recent is the Cambodian National Mine Action Standard on Environment but this 
contains only very general information on chemical contamination from EO. Cambodian Mine 
Action Standards. Chapter 20. Environmental Management in Mine Action Operations.
16. International Mine Action Standard 07.13, Environmental Management in Mine Action. First 
Edition. 14 March 2017.
17. For example, Chicala in Maputo Province, 2002. Email. Olaf Juergensen to R.Evans. 19 Febru-
ary 2020.
18. M. Jebens. “Protecting the Environment; Mine Clearance in Skallingen, Denmark”, The Journal 
of Conventional Weapons Destruction. Volume 19. Issue.1 Article 11. 2015.
19. https://adrbook.com/en/2017/UN/3288
20. Q3D Elemental Impurities Guidance for Industry. U. S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices Food and Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) Center 
for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) September 2015. pg. 42.
21. I. Bortone, F Coulon, W Fawcett-Hirst, M Ladyman and T Temple. “Scientific Principles of 
Environmental Management,” Global Approach to Environmental Management on Military 
Training Ranges. University of Cranfield. 2020. pg. 1-1–1-3. T. Temple and M. Ladyman (Eds)
22. S. L. Larson, W. Martin, C. Trest, P. Malone, C.Weiss, G. Fabian, M. Warminsky, D. Mackie, J. 
Tasca, J. Wildey, and J.Wright. Amended Ballistic Sand Studies to Provide Low Maintenance 
Lead Containment at Active Small Arms Firing Range Systems. US Army Corps of Engineers. 
Engineer Research and Development Center. Environmental Security Technology Certification 
Program. September 2007.
23. J. Morgan. Case Study - Aldershot Training Area B6, Caesars Camp. DIO Technical Services. 
March 2019.
24. The main risk of DU ammunition is the possibility of DU dust inhalation which can lead to kid-
ney damage. Current medical evidence, based on monitoring of a cohort of US veterans ex-
posed, suggest low increased risk of cancer for Gulf War exposures. K. Squibb, M.McDiarmid 
“Depleted Uranium Exposure and Health Effects in Gulf War Veterans,” Philosophical Transac-
tions of the Royal Society. March 2006. Volume 361. Issue 1468: pg. 639–648.
25. J. Kalinich, C. Emond and T. Dalton et al. “Embedded Weapons-Grade Tungsten Alloy Shrapnel 
Rapidly Induces Metastatic High-Grade Rhabdomyosarcomas in F344 Rats,” Environmental 
Health Perspectives. Volume 113. Issue 6. June 2005. pg. 729–734.
26. GB van der Voet. “Metals and Health: A Clinical Toxicological Perspective on Tungsten and 
Review of the Literature.,”Military Medicine, Volume 172, Issue 9, September 2007, pg. 
1,002–1,005.
27. Sintering is the process of compacting and forming a solid mass of material by heat or pres-
sure without melting it to the point of liquefaction. Oxford English Dictionary Second Edition. 
Oxford University Press 2009.
28. C. Emond, V. Vergara, E. Lombardini, S, Mog, J. Kalinich. “The Role of the Component Metals 
in the Toxicity of Military-Grade Tungsten Alloy,” Toxics 2015, Volume 3, Issue 4. pg. 499–514.
29. WNiCo splinters typically consist of 92% tungsten, 5% nickel, 3% cobalt. See E.Roedel, 
D.Cafasso, L.Lee, L.Pierce. Pulmonary toxicity after exposure to military-relevant heavy metal 
tungsten alloy particles. Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology. Volume 259, Issue 1, 15 
February 2012, pg. 74–86.
30. S. Chatterjee, U. Deb, S. Datta, C. Walther and D. Gupta. “Common explosives (TNT, RDX, 
HMX) and Their Fate in the Environment: Emphasizing BioreMediation,” Chemosphere. 
Volume 184. June 2017. pg. 438–451.
31. Methaglobin is unable to bind with oxygen. An abnormal amount of methaglobin formation 
causes the blood to be unable to release oxygen effectively to body tissues. 
32. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 40 CFR 261.30.
33. P.B. Tchounwou, C. Newsome, K. Glass, J.A. Centeno, J. Leszczynski, J. Bryant, J. Okoh, A. 
Ishaque, M. Brower. “Environmental Toxicology and Health Effects Associated with Dinitro-
toluene Exposure,” Reviews on Environmental Health, Volume 18, Issue 3, July 2003, pg. 
203–229.
34. https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/2-4-dinitrotoluene.pdf
35. Environmental Protection Agency. Technical Fact Sheet. RDX. November 2017 
36. Environmental Protection Agency. Technical Fact Sheet. TNT. November 2017 
37. Bruce, E. Rylott, S. Strand, A. Palazzo and T. Cary. “Sustainable Range Management of RDX 
and TNT by Phytoremediation with Engineered Plants,” Final Report. SERDP Project ER – 
1498. April 2016. pg. 3
38. Hewitt A D, Jenkins T F, Ranney T A, Stark J A and Walsh M E, 2003 “Technical Report: Esti-
mates for Explosives Residue from the Detonation of Army Munitions,” ERDC/CRREL TR-03, 
16 Hanover, USA. 
39. J. Pennington, B. Silverblatt , K. Poe , C. Hayes and S. Yost, 2008 “Explosive Residues from 
Low-Order Detonations of Heavy Artillery and Mortar rounds,” Soil Sediment Contamination: 
An International Journal. Volume 17, Issue-5, 2009 pg. 533–46.
40. Hewitt A D, Jenkins T F, Walsh M E, Walsh M R and Taylor S, 2005 “RDX and TNT Residues 
From Live-Fire and Blow-in-Place Detonations,” Chemosphere Volume 61, Issue 6, November 
2005. pg. 888–94. 
41. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Federal Facili-
ties Forum Issue Paper: “Site Characterization for Munitions Constituents,” January 2012. pg. 
32.
42. T. Jenkins, C.Vogel. “Department of Defense Best Management Practices for Munitions Con-
stituents on Operational Ranges,” SERDP 2014. November 2014. pg. 5
43. C. Madeira, J. Field, M. Simonich, R.Tanguay, J. Chorover, R. Sierra-Alvarez. “Ecotoxicity of the 
Insensitive Munitions Compound 3-nitro-1,2,4-triazol-5-one (NTO) and its Reduced etabolite 
3-amino-1,2,4-triazol-5-one (ATO),” Journal of Hazardous Materials. Volume 343. 2018. pg. 
340–346.
44. E. Lent, L. Crouse and S. Wallace. “Oral Toxicity of 2,4-Dinitroanisole in Rats,” International 
Journal of Toxicology. Volume 35. Issue 6. 2016. pg. 692–711.
45. T. Richard and J. Weidhaas. Biodegradation of IMX-101 explosive formulation 
constituents:2,4-Dinitroanisole (DNAN), 3-nitro-1,2,4-triazol-5-one (NTO), and nitroguanidine. 
Journal of Hazardous Materials. Volume 280. August 2014. pg. 372–379.
46. P. Brousseau, S.Thiboutot and E.Diaz. “Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) of Insensitive Mu-
nitions: Challenges and Solutions”, Defence R&D Canada - Valcartier Research Center. 2018. 
47. M. Walsh, S.Thiboutot, V.Gullett. “Characterization of Residues from the Detonation of Insen-
sitive Munitions SERDP Project ER-2219,” Final Report. November 2017. pg. 82.
48. M. Walsh et al. “Characterization of PAX-21 Insensitive Munition Detonation Residues,” 
Propellants, Explosives, Pyrotechnics. Volume 38. Issue 3. June 2003. pg. 399–409.
49. Environmental Protection Agency. Technical Fact Sheet. Perchlorate. November 2017. 
50. S. Thiboutot, R. Martel, S. Brochu and M. R. Walsh. Mitigation of the environmental footprint 
of a munition. In T. Temple and M. Ladyman (Eds), Global Approach to Environmental Man-
agement on Military Training Ranges. University of Cranfield. 2020. pg. 11-2–11-4.
51. P. Brousseau, S.Thiboutot and E.Diaz. Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) of Insensitive Muni-
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53. P. Brousseau, S.Thiboutot and E.Diaz. “Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) of Insensitive 
Munitions: Challenges and Solutions,” Defence R&D Canada - Valcartier Research Center. 
2018. pg. 8.
54. A. Cumming. “Legislative Impact,”  Energetic Materials and Munitions Life Cycle Manage-
ment, Environmental Impact and Demilitarization. pg. 2–4, A.Cumming and M.Johnson (Eds).
55. J. Wilkinson, D.Watt. “Review of Demilitarisation and Disposal Tecniques for Munitions and 
related Materials,” Munitions Safety Information Management Center. NATO. January 2006. 
pg. 15.
56. D. Towndrow. “General Introduction to Ammunition Demilitarization,” In A.Cumming and 
M.Johnson (Eds). Energetic Materials and Munitions Life Cycle Management, Environmental 
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Measuring Behavior Change Resulting from EORE and the Need for Complementary Risk Reduction 
Activities by Boyd, Kasack, and Nielsen [ from page 23 ]
1. “Combating land-mines in El Salvador,” UNICEF, accessed 18 March 2020, https://uni.
cf/33t86r9 . 
2. EORE is a recent term following on from mine risk education (MRE) that aims to reflect more 
adequately that EORE efforts comprise other types of explosive ordnance as well. See IMAS 
12.10 Mine/ERW Risk Education. For more on explosive ordnance, see IMAS 04.10 Glossary 
of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations.
3. “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education, Sector mapping and needs analysis,” GICHD 2019, 
accessed 18 March 2020, https://bit.ly/39XrajQ, page 32 3.4: “The situation is particularly 
problematic for measuring behaviour change, the long-term aim of EORE, because sustained 
behaviour change takes place over an extended period of time.”
4. REPP surveys are conducted one-on-one with usually one or two persons per EORE session 
(10–12 questions, lasting 7–10 minutes). The answers provide a good idea as to whether 
knowledge increased (with a post-interview done right after the EORE session) and, if an-
other interview is conducted three to six months later, how much knowledge was retained. 
Although answers are not statistically representative, a high number of sessions and a strict 
protocol for selecting interviewees are measures followed to get best results possible.
5. “Evaluation Report UK Department for International Development SUMMATIVE EVALUATION 
OF THE DFID GLOBAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME,” Itad, May 2018, accessed 3 April 2020, 
https://bit.ly/2Rah0oD, page 10.  
6. For guidance on FGDs, see OXFAM Research Guidelines 2015, Conducting Focus Groups, or 
MSF (no year), Le Focus Group, Guide Collecte (en Français). 
7. “Focus Group Discussion Guidelines for Communities, Risk Communication and Community 
Engagement for the New Coronavirus.” IFRC. Accessed 6 April 2020. https://uni.cf/2xY452f . 
8. Community outreach team is DFID’s terminology. MAG prefers the term community liaison 
(CL), a term that is used at times in this article.
9. “IMAS Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 1, An Introduction to Mine Risk Educa-
tion,” GICHD/UNICEF 2005, accessed 18 March 2020, https://bit.ly/3b4Frve , page 11.   
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10. While the role of the Technical Notes for Mine Action (TNMAs) is to explain how to comply 
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nature, there is not such a clear distinction within the IMAS system between documents that 
contain exclusively requirements and those that provide supporting guidance.     
11. The normative elements are those ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ statements found within the 
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12. Such as the extensive recommendations in Annex B to IMAS 07.40 on the conduct of site 
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practices and management oversight during IEDD operations.  
The Lethality Index: Re-Conceptualizing IED Clearance Planning and Delivery in Iraq by Wilkinson  
[ from page 38 ]
1. While UNMAS has a number for Iraq, and it’s relevant, the same question still applies to 
other environments. For further information, please see Landmine Monitor 2019 Report, 
accessed 15 June 2020, http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3074086/Landmine-Monitor-
2019-Report-Final.pdf, p. 88: in 2018, Iraq received $116.4M in international support; p.89: 
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